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BAR BRIEFS
states as follows: California 4,5oo, Kansas 335, Nebraska 260, Ore-
gon 303, Wisconsin 144, Indiana 7oo, Michigan Ioo.
The other decision relates to the attitude of certain organizations
towards established government. For years officials of such groups as
the American Civil Liberties Union have openly preached that it was
within the purview of the right to free speech for men to advocate
murder, etc., so long as no overt act was committed by the speaker.
Then followed the enactment of syndicalism laws, one of which, the
California law, was involved in the recent case. This law makes it a
crime "knowingly to be or to become a member of, or to assist in or-
ganizing an association to advocate, teach or aid and abet the commis-
sion of crimes or unlawful acts of force, violence or terrorism as a
means of accomplishing industrial or political changes". Upon con-
viction of Charlotte Anita Whitney for violation of this law, appeal
was taken to the U. S. Supreme Court, that Court-though not con-
vinced that the policy of enacting such legislation is good-sustaining
its constitutionality, and holding, "That a State, in the exercise of
its police power, may punish those who abuse this freedom (of speech)
by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to incite to crime,
disturb the public peace, or endanger the foundations of organized
government, and threaten its overthrow by unlawful means"; and that
such association as the law aims to prohibit "involves even greater
danger to the public peace and security than the isolated utterances and
acts of individuals."
It is the last phrase quoted which appeals to us and to many
others as complete justification for the enactment of such legislation.
If organized society were to be compelled to wait until after its ene-
mies had attempted specific overt acts to accomplish their purpose,
and were to be denied the right to defend itself against the "greater
danger" of organized, destructive conspiracies, constitutional govern-
ment might soon find itself in a precarious position. The warning
against intolerant use of such legislative weapons is timely and very
much in order, however.
THE TRIAL MUST BE FAIR
The Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Tumey vs.
Ohio, 37 Supreme Court Reports 437, has once again made clear the
fundamental principle that a person charged with crime in an American
Court is entitled to a fair and impartial hearing.
Under an Ohio statute empowering city and village councils to
use fines imposed in convictions for violations of the prohibition act
the Village of North College Hill passed an ordinance extending judi-
cial powers to the mayor and allowing him to retain costs assessed in
such cases, in addition to his regular salary as mayor. The defendant,
Tumey, raised the objection that such proceedings were in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and this objection the Supreme Court sus-
tained.
The Court pointed out that the result of the normal operation of
this law and ordinance brought every defendant before a judicial offi-
cer who had a direct pecuniary interest in a conviction, otherwise there
would be no fee; and that, although the cost impositions were small in
the individual case, the fact that the emoluments of the mayor were
increased to the extent of $ioo per month indicated that the prospect of
loss of such additional sums might readily prove a temptation to the
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average man so as to cause him to forget the burden of proof required
to convict.
"The requirement of due process of law", said the Court, "is not
satisfied by the argument that men of the highest honor and the great-
est self-sacrifice could carry it on without danger of injustice." Due
process of law is denied when the procedure offers a possible tempta-
tion to the average man "not to hold the balance nice, clear and true
between the State and the accused."
And thus, once again, ranters against American government are
effectively contradicted by concrete evidence that the quality of Amer-
ican justice is guaranteed by the Constitution which they assail and
deride.
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
A special committee of the American Bar Association will present
a divided report to the annual meeting in August, covering additional
canons and a summary of professional ideals. The summary submitted
by the majority of the committee appears unnecessarily long and de-
tailed, and the following substitute by Mr. F. W. Grinnell all-sufficient
and preferable:
"The specification in the foregoing canons of certain conduct as
unprofessional is not to be interpreted as an implied approval of con-
duct not specifically described. The purpose of the canons is to assist
lawyers by stimulating their imagination as to sound professional be-
havior. That purpose is indicated by the statement in the 'preamble'
to the canons that the stability of courts and of all departments of the
government rests upon the approval of the people and that it is, there-
fore, essential that the agencies in the administration of justice be so
developed and maintained that the public shall have confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of its administration.
"The reason that the profession is recognized and set apart by
law as a body of sworn public officers is the public necd of a body
of trained, reliable men to whom individual citizens may trust their
private affairs in order to secure justice. If the Bar is thus set apart
as a profession it must preserve such sound traditions and standards as
have contributed to the public confidence that has given it its position
and which is essential to its freedom of action in future.
"The canons simply reflect the better standards of practice, the
history of which is not always conveniently available. Their expres-
sion in this form was the result of a growing need of counteracting
practices which contribute to the gradual loss of public confidence in
the profession.
"Violation of the seasoned professional standards of conduct thus
reflected and suggested may merit or result in different degrees of
disapproval ranging from disbarment, suspension, or censure, to lessen-
ing of respect for the character or taste or general reputation of the
individual lawyer. No lawyer can justify his conduct merely because
he does not find it specified in the canons as unprofessional. He must
do his own thinking as a trusted representative and advisor and take
the consequences."
NEW - LAW - ITIS
The 1927 sessions of the various legislatures witnessed the intro-
duction of 42,ooo bills, ii,5oo of which became the victims of majority
